A class of stochastic games and moving free boundary problems by Guo, Xin et al.
A CLASS OF STOCHASTIC GAMES AND MOVING FREE BOUNDARY
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Abstract. In this paper we propose and analyze a class of stochastic N -player games that
includes finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the
Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification theorem, which reveals an essential game
component regarding the interaction among players. It is an analytical representation of the
conditional optimality condition for NEs, largely missing in the existing literature on stochastic
games. The derivation of NEs involves first solving a multi-dimensional free boundary problem
and then a Skorokhod problem, where the boundary is “moving” in that it depends on both
the changes of the system and the control strategies of other players. Finally, we reformulate
NE strategies in the form of controlled rank-dependent stochastic differential equations.
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1. Introduction
N -player non-zero-sum stochastic games are notoriously hard. Recently there has been a
surge of interest on Mean Field Games (MFGs), pioneered by [32, 44, 45, 46]. With an ingenious
aggregation approach, MFGs nicely reduce the complexity of N -player games by focusing on
N →∞. However, there are undesirable consequences of the MFG aggregation approach and
a growing number of studies [14, 43, 27] point to the risk of using MFGs for analyzing N -player
games. For instance, Nash equilibria (NEs) of MFGs tend to collapse to that of a single-player
game, offering no or limited insight into the general solution structure of N -player games.
Motivated by the need for a more in-depth study of N -player stochastic games, in this work
we formulate and analyze a class of stochastic N -player games that originate from the well-
known finite fuel problem. There are many reasons to consider this type of games. Firstly, the
finite fuel problem is one of the landmarks in stochastic control theory and a game formulation
is natural [4, 5, 39, 37, 40, 22, 6]. Secondly, its simple yet insightful solution structures have had
a wide range of applications beyond stochastic control [18, 17, 16, 30, 23, 7, 61, 29, 63, 58, 57,
19, 41, 2, 8]. Thirdly, there is no prior work analyzing its stochastic game counterpart except
for the special case of N = 2 and without the fuel constraint [49, 38, 28, 31, 42, 20, 27]. We hope
that analyzing this game can shed more light on the fundamental differences between control
problems and stochastic games and thus provide useful insights into the intrinsic difficulty of
the latter.
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The stochastic game presented in this paper goes as follows. There are N players whose
dynamics X t = (X
1
t , · · · , XNt ) is governed by the following N -dimensional diffusion process:
dXit = bi(X t)dt+ σi(X t)dB(t) + dξ
i+
t − dξi−t , Xi0− = xi, (i = 1, . . . , N), (1.1)
whereB := (B1, . . . , BN ) is a standardN -dimensional Brownian motion in a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), with drift b := (b1, . . . , bN ) and covariance matrix σ := (σ1 , . . . ,σN )
satisfying appropriate regularity conditions. Player i’s control, ξi = (ξi+, ξi−), is a pair of
non-decreasing and ca`dla`g processes, and of finite variation. Each player has access to some or
all of M types of resources. Players interact through their objective functions hi(X1t , . . . , X
N
t ),
as well as their shared resources that are the “fuels” of their control. The accessibility of
these resources to players and how these resources are consumed by their respective players are
governed by a matrix A := (aij)i,j ∈ RN×M . The goal of the game is for player i to minimize
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αthi(X1t , . . . , X
N
t )dt.
over appropriate admissible game strategies, specified in Section 2. When M = 1 and A =
[1, 1, . . . , 1]T ∈ RN×1, this is a pooling game Cp corresponding to the N -player finite fuel game
where the N players share a fixed amount of the same resource. When M = N and A = IN ,
this is an N -player game Cd where each player has her individual fixed amount of resource. In
general, this matrix A describes the network structure of the N -player game. Note that this
N -player game cannot be simply analyzed with an MFG approach as the network structure
would collapse if an aggregation approach was applied.
We will analyze the NEs of this stochastic game. We first derive sufficient conditions for
the NE policy in the form of a verification theorem (Theorem 3.4), which reveals an essential
game element regarding the interaction among players. This is the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman
(HJB) representation of the conditional optimality condition for NE in a stochastic game. To
understand the structural properties of the NEs, we proceed further to analyze this stochastic
game in terms of the game values, the NE points, and the controlled dynamics. Mathemati-
cally, the analysis involves first solving a multi-dimensional free boundary problem and then
a Skorokhod problem with a moving boundary. The boundary is “moving” in that it moves
in response to both the changes of the system and the control strategies of other players. The
analytical solution is derived by first exploring the two special games Cp and Cd . Analyzing
these two types of games provides key insights into the solution structure of the general game.
Finally, we reformulate the NE strategies in the form of controlled rank-dependent stochastic
differential equations (SDEs), and compare game values with games Cp and Cd .
Main contributions. (i) In the verification theorem for N -player games, we obtain the correct
form of the HJB equations for general stochastic games with singular controls. Unlike all
previous analysis that focused on two-player games, we show that in addition to the standard
HJBs that correspond to stochastic control problems, there is an essential term that is unique to
stochastic games. This term represents the interaction among players, especially the ones who
are active and those who are waiting. This critical term was missing in two-player stochastic
games and was simply (mis)understood as a regularity condition (Remark 3.3).
(ii) This structural difference between games and control problems is further revealed in the
explicit solution of the NEs for N -player games. Instead of the usual free boundary for control
problems, the free boundary for games is “moving”. In a Markovian control problem, a free
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boundary depends on the state of the system; in stochastic games, however, the “face” of the
boundary moves based on the action of herself and other players (Figure 4).
(iii) This difference is further highlighted in the framework of controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
To the best of our knowledges, this is the first time a stochastic game is explicitly connected
with rank-dependent SDEs in a more general form. This new form of rank-dependent SDEs
presents a fresh class of yet-to-be studied SDEs (Section 7.2).
(iv) Finally, stochastic games considered in this paper are resource allocation games. Resource
allocation problems have a wide range of applications including cloud computing, smart power
grid control, and multimedia wireless networks [47, 26, 54, 64, 25]. However, the existing
literature has been unsuccessful in analyzing the resource allocation problem in the setting of
stochastic games. Besides the technical contributions, our analysis provides a useful economic
insight: in a stochastic game of resource allocations, sharing has lower cost than dividing and
pooling yields the lowest cost for each player.
Related work. There are several papers on non-zero-sum games with singular controls [49, 38,
28, 31, 42, 20, 27]. All of these works are games without the fuel constraint and thus are built
on one-dimension stochastic control problems. Furthermore, except for [27], all of these papers
are restricted to the case of N = 2. Most importantly, because of the restricted problem setting,
none of these works managed to discover the critical structural difference between stochastic
games and controls. We believe our work is the first to complete the mathematical analysis on
an N -player stochastic game based on an original two-dimensional control problem.
There has been some work on reflected SDEs in time-dependent domains. Reflected Brownian
motion in smooth time-dependent domains with normal reflection was considered by [9, 10] via
the heat equation. The one-dimensional case was also studied by [11] through the Skorokhod
problem. Later, [51, 48] gave the construction of reflected SDEs in non-smooth time-dependent
domains with oblique reflection. There is some work, i.e. [59, 12, 62], on Brownian motion re-
flected on another Brownian motion, motivated from the study of the Brownian web. However,
none of these works involves controls.
In our work the controlled dynamics and the moving free boundary are recast in the frame-
work of controlled rank-dependent SDEs. The rank-dependent SDEs without controls arise
in the “Up the River” problem [1] and in stochastic portfolio theory [24], including the well-
studied Atlas model for the ergodicity and sample path properties [3, 34, 35, 33, 52, 55, 56] and
for the hydrodynamic limit and fluctuations of the Atlas model [21, 60, 13]. Compared to the
well-known rank-dependent SDEs, rank-dependent SDEs with an additional control component
has not been studied before. We establish the existence of the solution by directly constructing
a reflected diffusion process. (See Section 7.2 for further discussions.)
Notations and organization. Throughout the paper, we denote vectors/matrices by bold
case letters, e.g., x and X . The tranpose of a real vector x is denoted as xT . For a vector x,
‖x‖ denotes its l2 norm. For a matrix X , ‖X‖ denotes its spectral norm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mathematical formulation of the
N -player game. Section 3 provides verification theorem for sufficient conditions of the NE of
the game. Section 4 studies game Cp and Section 5 studies game Cd . With the insight from
these two games, Section 6 analyzes the general N -player game C . Section 7 compares games
Cp , Cd and C , discusses the game values and their economic implications, and unifies their
corresponding controlled dynamics in the framework of the controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
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2. Problem Setup
Now we present the mathematical formulation for the stochastic N -player game.
Controlled dynamics. Let (Xit)t≥0 be the position of player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . In the absence of
controls, X t = (X
1
t , . . . , X
N
t ) is governed by the stochastic differential equation (SDE):
dX t = b(X t)dt+ σ(X t)dB(t), X 0− = (x1, . . . , xN ), (2.1)
whereB := (B1, . . . , BN ) is a standardN -dimensional Brownian motion in a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P), with the drift b(·) := (b1(·), . . . , bN (·)) and the covariance matrix
σ(·) := (σij(·))1≤i,j≤N . To ensure the existence and uniqueness of the SDE, b(·) and σ(·)
are assumed to satisfy the usual regularity conditions. For instance, b(·) and σ(·) are Lipschitz
continuous. That is, there exists a constant L such that ||b(x)−b(y)||+||σ(x)−σ(y)|| ≤ L||x−y||
for all x,y ∈ RN . Here and throughout the rest of the paper, the infinitesimal generator L is
L :=
∑
i
bi(x)
∂
∂xi
+
1
2
∑
i,j
(σ(x)σ(x)T )i,j
∂2
∂xi∂xj
, (2.2)
where σ(x)σ(x)T is assumed to be positive-definite for every x ∈ RN . See [53, Section V], or
[36, Chapter IV] for background on SDEs.
If a control is applied to Xit , then X
i
t evolves as
dXit = bi(X t)dt+ σ i(X t)dB(t) + dξ
i+
t − dξi−t , Xi0− = xi, (2.3)
where σ i is the i
th row of the covariance matrix σ. Here the control (ξi+, ξi−) is a pair of
non-decreasing and ca`dla`g processes, and of finite variation.
Game objective. The game is for player i to minimize, for all (ξi+, ξi−) in an appropriate
admissible control set, over an infinite time horizon, the following objective function,
E
∫ ∞
0
e−αthi(X1t , . . . , X
N
t )dt. (2.4)
Here α is a constant discount factor. In this game, players interact through their respective
objective functions hi(x) : RN → R+, which are assumed to be twice differentiable, with
k ≤ ||∇2hi(x)|| ≤ K for some K > k > 0. For example, hi(x) = h(xi −
∑N
j=1 x
j
N ) is a distance
function between the position of player i and the center of all players.
Admissible control policies. The admissible control set SN (y) for this N -player game is
given by
SN (y) :=
{
ξ : ξi ∈ U iN for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
N∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
aijY
j
t−∑M
j=1 aijY
j
t−
dξˇit ≤ yj , 1 ≤ j ≤M,
P
(
dξit (X t,Y t) dξ
k
t (X t,Y t) 6= 0
)
= 0 for all t ≥ 0 and i 6= k
}
,
(2.5)
where
U iN :=
{
(ξ+, ξ−) : ξ+ and ξ− are FX,Y -progressively measurable,
ca`dla`g, non-decreasing, with ξ+0− = ξ
−
0− = 0
}
,
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with FX,Y the natural filtrations of (X,Y ), and
Y jt = y
j −
N∑
i=1
∫ t
0
aijY
j
s−∑M
j=1 aijY
j
s−
dξˇis ∈ R+ and Y j0− = yj , (2.6)
with aij = 0 or 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ j ≤ M ,
∑M
j=1 aij > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N , and∑N
i=1 aij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M .
Here is the intuition for SN (y). In this game, each player i will make a decision based on
the current positions of all players and the available resources. In addition to this adaptedness
constraint, the admissible control set SN (y) specifies the resource allocation policy for each
player. For M different types of resources, define A := (aij)i,j ∈ RN×M to be the adjacent
matrix with aij = 0 or 1. Then A describes the relationship between the players and the
types of available resources, with aij = 1 meaning that resource of type j is available to player
i, and aij = 0 meaning that resource of type j is inaccessible to player i. The condition∑M
j=1 aij > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N implies that each player i has access to at least one resource,
and the condition
∑N
i=1 aij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,M indicates that each resource j is available
to at least one player. Moreover, when there are multiple types of resources available, player i
consumes available resources randomly, resulting in the form of the integrand in the expression
of Yt. See Figure 1 for illustration.
(a) Relationship. (b) Resource allocation policy.
Figure 1. Example of adjacent matrix Aˆ, relationship between the players and
resources when N = 4 and M = 6.
Take an example of N = 4, M = 6, with the matrix Aˆ defined as
Aˆ =
1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 00, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0
0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0
 ,
(Figure 1a). The resource allocation policy is illustrated in Figure 1b, with the amount of
available resource y1 and y2 of types one and two respectively. When player one wishes to
apply controls of amount ∆, say ∆ ≤ y1 + y2, she will consume resources randomly from type
one and two. So player one will take ∆ y
1
y1+y2
from resource one and ∆ y
2
y1+y2
from resource
two. Finally, the condition P(dξitdξkt 6= 0) = 0 for all t ≥ 0 and i 6= k excludes the possibility
of simultaneous jumps of N players, which facilitates designing feasible control policies when
controls involve jumps.
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Games formulation. Let ξ := (ξ1, . . . , ξN ) be the controls from the players. Let x :=
(x1, . . . , xN ) and y := (y1, . . . , yM ). Then the stochastic game is for each player i to minimize
J i(x,y;ξ) := E
∫ ∞
0
e−αthi(X t)dt, (2.7)
subject to the dynamics in (2.3) and (2.6) with the constraint in (2.5). There are two special
games of particular interest. One is a game where all players pool their resources such that
N∑
i=1
∫ ∞
0
dξˇis < y <∞. (2.8)
Here
ξˇit := ξ
i+
t + ξ
i−
t , (2.9)
is the accumulative amount of controls/resources consumed by player i up to time t. When
N = 1, this is a single player game corresponding to the finite fuel control problem which is
well studied in [5, 39]. We call this game a pooling game Cp . Clearly in terms of the adjacent
matrix A, this corresponds to M = 1, and A = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T ∈ RN×1. Another is a game where
players divide the resource up front such that∫ ∞
0
dξˇis < yi, (2.10)
where yi is the total amount of controls that player i can exercise. This game is called Cd , with
M = N , and A = IN . Finally, we refer the game with a general A as game C .
3. Game Solution under NE and Verification Theorem
We will analyze the N -player game under the criterion of Markovian NE. See [15] for various
concepts of NE of differential games. Recall the definition of a Markovian NE of N -player
games.
Definition 3.1. A tuple of admissible controls ξ∗ := (ξ1∗, . . . ξN∗) is a Markovian NE of the
N -player game (2.7), if for each ξi such that (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN (y),
J i (x,y;ξ∗) ≤ J i (x,y; (ξ−i∗, ξi)) ,
where ξ−i∗ = (ξ1∗, · · · , ξi−1∗, ξi+1∗, · · · , ξN∗) and (ξ−i∗, ξi) = (ξ1∗, · · · , ξi−1∗, ξi, ξi+1∗, · · · , ξN∗).
Here the strategies ξi∗ and ξi are deterministic function of time t, X t = (X1t , . . . , XNt ), and
Y t = (Y
1
t , . . . , Y
M
t ), with X 0− = x and Y 0− = y. Controls that give Markovian NEs are called
the Markovian Nash Equilibrium Points (MNEPs). The associated value function is called the
game value.
We first derive heuristically the associated HJB equations for the game (2.7). To this end,
we start with some notations of region partitions for each player.
Definition 3.2 (Action and waiting regions). The ith player’s action region is
Ai := {(x,y) ∈ RN × RM+ : dξi(x,y) 6= 0},
and its waiting region is Wi := (RN × RM+ ) \ Ai. Let A−i := ∪j 6=iAj, and W−i := ∩j 6=iWj.
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Now the HJB is derived as follows. When Aj∩Ai = ∅ for all i 6= j and (x,y) ∈ W−i, ∆ξj∗ = 0
for j 6= i. Thus the game for player i becomes a classical control problem with three cases:
∆ξi∗ = 0, ∆ξi∗,+ > 0, and ∆ξi∗,− < 0. The case ∆ξi∗ = 0 implies, by simple stochastic calculus,
−αvi + hi (x) + Lvi = 0, the case ∆ξi∗,+ > 0 corresponds to −∑Mj=1 aijyj∑M
k=1 aiky
k
vi
yj
+ vi
xi
= 0,
and the case ∆ξi∗,− > 0 corresponds to −∑Mj=1 aijyj∑M
k=1 aiky
k
vi
yj
− vi
xi
= 0. 1 In short, we have
for (x,y) ∈ W−i,
min
(xi,y)∈R×RM+
−αvi + hi (x) + Lvi,−
M∑
j=1
aijy
j∑M
k=1 aiky
k
viyj + v
i
xi ,−
M∑
j=1
aijy
j∑M
k=1 aiky
k
viyj − vixi
 = 0.
(3.1)
When (x,y) ∈ Aj , player j will control. Denote the amount of control by player j as
(∆ξj∗,+,∆ξj∗,−). When Aj ∩ Ai = ∅ for all i 6= j, we should have,
vi(x,y) = vi
(
x−j , xj + dξj∗,+ − dξj∗,−, y −
(
aj1y
j∑M
k=1 ajky
j
, · · · , ajNy
j∑M
k=1 ajky
j
)
(∆ξj∗,+ + ∆ξj∗,−)
)
.
This leads to
min
(xj ,y)∈R×RM+
{
−
M∑
k=1
ajky
k∑M
s=1 ajsy
s
viyk + v
i
xj ,−
M∑
k=1
ajky
k∑M
s=1 ajsy
s
viyk − vixj
}
= 0. (3.2)
Remark 3.3. Note that when N = 2, the above equation corresponds to the continuity condition
of game values. For general N -player games, it is a mathematical description of interactions
between the player in control and those who are not. It guarantees that all players control
optimally so that they sequentially push the underlying dynamics until reaching the common
waiting region. This is consistent with the intuition that NE is conditionally optimal for each
player.
Next we present a verification theorem which gives sufficient conditions of an MNEP.
Theorem 3.4 (Verification theorem). Assume Aj∩Ai = ∅ for all i 6= j. For each i = 1, . . . , N ,
suppose that the ith player’s strategy ξi∗ ∈ U iN satisfies the following conditions
(i) ξ∗ := (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗) ∈ SN (y),
(ii) vi(·) = J i(·;ξ∗) satisfies the HJB equation (3.1) for (x,y) ∈ W−i,
(iii) vi(x,y) satisfies the transversality condition
lim sup
T→∞
e−αTEvi (XT ,Y T ) = 0, (3.3)
(iv) vi(x,y) ∈ C2(W−i), and there exists convex function ui(x,y) ∈ C2(RN ×RM+ ) such that
ui(x,y) = vi(x,y) for all (x,y) ∈ W−i,
(v) vi
xj
is bounded in W−i for each j = 1, 2, · · · , N ,
(vi) for any ξi ∈ U iN such that (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN (y),
P((X−i∗t , X
i
t ,Y t) ∈ W−i) = 1 for all t ≥ 0,
1By convention, we adopt 0
0
= 0.
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(vii) vi(·) satisfies the equation (3.2) when (x,y) ∈ Aj,
then ξ∗ is an MNEP with value function vi.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. It suffices to prove that for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
J i(x,y;ξ∗) ≤ J i(x,y; (ξ−i∗, ξi)),
for all (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN (y).
Recall (2.1) and (2.6). From condition (vi), under control (ξ−i∗, ξi) ∈ SN (y), (X−i∗t , Xit ,Y t) ∈
W−i a.s.. Applying Itoˆ-Meyer’s formula [50, Theorem 21] to e−αtui(X−i∗t , Xit ,Y t) yields
E[e−αTui(X−i∗T , X
i
T ,Y T )]− ui(x,y)
= E
∫ T
0
e−αt
(Lui − αui) dt+ E∫ T
0
e−αt
N∑
j=1
uixjdB
j
t
+ E
∫
[0,T )
e−αt(uixidξ
i,+
t − uixidξi,−t )− E
∫
[0,T )
e−αt
M∑
j=1
aijY
j
t−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
t−
(
uiyjdξ
i,+
t + u
i
yjdξ
i,−
t
)
+ E
∑
0≤t<T
e−αt(∆ui − uixi∆Xit −
M∑
j=1
uiyj∆Y
j
t ).
Note that condition (v) implies that
∫ T
0 e
−αt∑N
j=1 u
i
xj
dBjt is a uniformly integrable martingale.
Now by conditions (ii), (iv), (v) and the convexity of ui, we get
e−αTEvi(X−i∗T , X
i
T ,Y T ) + E
∫ T
0
e−αth
(
X−i∗t , X
i
t
)
dt ≥ vi(x,y). (3.4)
By letting T → ∞, the inequality (3.4) and condition (iii) lead to the desirable inequality.
Along with condition (vii), the equality holds with value vi(x,y). 
Our next task is to solve explicitly the game C , based on sufficient conditions in the above
verification theorem. We will first analyze games Cp and Cd to gain insight into the solution
structure. For ease of exposition, we assume for i = 1, . . . , N ,
bi = 0, σ = IN , and h
i(x) := h
(
xi −
∑N
j=1 x
j
N
)
,
where h is convex, symmetric and h(0) ≥ 0.
4. Nash Equilibrium for Game Cp
This section analyzes the Markovian NE of game Cp . Section 4.1 derives the solution to the
HJB equations. Section 4.2 constructs the controlled process from the HJB solution. Section
4.3 derives the NE for the gameCp and specifies the NE for the two-player game with h(x) = x
2.
Recall that in game Cp , A = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T ∈ RN×1, and
Yt = y −
N∑
i=1
ξˇit and Y0− = y. (4.1)
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4.1. Solving HJB equations. Define
x˜i := xi −
∑
j 6=i x
j
N − 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (4.2)
to be the distance from xi to the center of (xj)j 6=i. For game Cp , if Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, the HJB
system simplifies to
(HJB-Cp)

min
(xi,y)∈R×R+
−αvi + h
(
N − 1
N
x˜i
)
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
vixjxj ,−viy + vixi ,−viy − vixi
 = 0,
for (x, y) ∈ W−i,
min
(xj ,y)∈R×R+
{−viy + vixj ,−viy − vixj} = 0, for (x, y) ∈ Aj , j 6= i.
Now we look for a threshold function fN : R→ R with fN (−x) = fN (x) such that the action
region Ai and the waiting region Wi of the ith player are defined by
Ai := (E+i ∪ E−i ) ∩Qi and Wi := (RN × R+) \ Ai, (4.3)
where
E+i :=
{
(x, y) ∈ RN × R+ : x˜i ≥ f−1N (y)
}
and E−i :=
{
(x, y) ∈ RN × R+ : x˜i ≤ −f−1N (y)
}
,
(4.4)
and
Qi := {(x, y) ∈ RN × R+ : |x˜i| ≥ |x˜k| for k < i, |x˜i| > |x˜k| for k > i}.
Note here the partition {Qi}1≤i≤N is introduced to avoid simultaneous jumps by multiple
players so that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅. The key idea of designing the partition is that if several players
are in E+i ∪ E−i , the player who is the farthest away from the center controls. If ties occur,
the player with the largest index controls. It is easy to see that Wi 6= ∅ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and
Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for i 6= j.
We seek a solution vi(x, y) ∈ C2(W−i) such that if |x˜i| < f−1N (y), it is of the form,
vi(x, y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN (y) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
, (4.5)
where
pN (x) := E
∫ ∞
0
e−αth
(
N − 1
N
x+
√
N − 1
N
Bt
)
dt. (4.6)
Note that pN (x˜
i) is a solution to −αvi + h(N−1N x˜i) + 12
∑N
j=1 v
i
xjxj
= 0, which corresponds to
the waiting region, and cosh(
√
2(N−1)α
N x˜
i) is a solution to −αvi + 12
∑N
j=1 v
i
xjxj
= 0. If there is
no resource, then vi(x, y) = pN (x˜
i), so AN (0) = 0. Now applying the smooth-fit principle at
the boundary y = fN (x˜
i) with x˜i > 0, we get
A
′
N (fN ) = −p
′
N cosh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
+ p
′′
N
√
N
2(N − 1)α sinh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
,
AN (fN ) = p
′
N
√
N
2(N − 1)α sinh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
− p′′N
N
2(N − 1)α cosh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
.
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As a consequence,
f ′N (x) =
p
′
N − N2(N−1)αp
′′′
N
p
′′
N
√
N
2(N−1)α tanh
(
x
√
2(N−1)α
N
)
− p′N
, (4.7)
and
AN (y) = p
′
N
√
N
2(N − 1)α sinh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
−p′′N
N
2(N − 1)α cosh
(
x
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)∣∣∣∣∣
x=f−1N (y)
.
(4.8)
Moreover, the curve y = fN (x) intersects {x > 0} at x0 such that AN (fN (x0)) = 0. That is,
x0 is the smallest positive root of√
2(N − 1)α
N
tanh
(
z
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
=
p
′′
N (z)
p
′
N (z)
. (4.9)
Specializing to the case h(x) = x2, we get
psqN (x) =
(
N − 1
N
)2 x2
α
+
N − 1
Nα2
, (4.10)
fsqN (x) =
∫ |x|∧c√ N
2(N−1)α
c
√
N
2(N−1)α
(
1
z
√
N
2(N − 1)α tanh
(
z
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
− 1
)−1
dz, (4.11)
where c is the unique positive root of z tanh z = 1, and
AsqN (y) = −
N
N − 1α
2(cosh z − z sinh(z))
∣∣∣∣∣
z=f−1N (y)
√
2(N−1)α
N
. (4.12)
4.2. Controlled dynamics. Given the candidate solution to (HJB-Cp), we construct the
corresponding NEP by defining the dynamics of the controlled process (X t, Yt; t ≥ 0). This is
a diffusion with degeneracy in Y , and living in an unbounded polyhedron for a fixed Y .
To start, for y ≥ 0, let
WNE(y) : = {x ∈ RN : |x˜i| < f−1N (y) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
=
{
x ∈ RN : ni · x > −
√
N − 1
N
f−1N (y) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2N
}
(4.13)
= ∩Ni=1(E−i (y) ∪ E+i (y))c,
where for i = 1, . . . , N ,
E+i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x, y) ∈ E+i }, E−i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x, y) ∈ E−i },
and
ni =
√
N − 1
N
(
− 1
N − 1 , . . . ,−
1
N − 1 , 1,−
1
N − 1 , . . . ,−
1
N − 1
)
,
with the ith component to be 1, and ni+N = −ni. Note that for N ≥ 3, the section WNE(y) is
an unbounded polyhedron with 2N boundary faces
Fi(y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E−i (y) and Fi+N (y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E+i (y) for i = 1, . . . , N,
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and nj is the unit normal vector of Fj(y) (j = 1, 2, · · · , 2N). For N = 2, the section WNE(y)
is a strip delimited by two straight lines
F1(y) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : x1 − x2 = −f−12 (y)},
and
F2(y) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : x1 − x2 = f−12 (y)}.
Define the reflection vector on each boundary Fi(y) by
ri = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
with the ith component being 1, and ri+N = −ri for i = 1, . . . , N . Note that
rj ·nj =
√
N − 1
N
for j = 1, . . . , 2N, (4.14)
so the reflection vectors (rj)1≤j≤2N satisfy the skew symmetry condition [63] in the polyhedron
WNE(y). The result of Williams [63], together with a localization argument, shows that there
exists a reflected Brownian motion in the polyhedron WNE(y) which is defined as a solution
to a submartingale problem. More precisely, the reflected process Ry(t) = (R
1
y(t), . . . , R
N
y (t))
with Ry(0) = x ∈ WNE(y) is defined by
Riy(t) = x
i +Bi(t) + ηiy(t)− ηi+Ny (t) ∈ WNE(y) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (4.15)
where (ηjy(t); t ≥ 0) is the local time process on the boundary Fj(y) such that ηjy is continuous
and non-decreasing with ηjy(0−) = 0, and ηjy increases only at times t such that Rjy(t) ∈ Fj(y).
Moreover, if x /∈ Fi(y) ∩ Fj(y) for any i 6= j, we have
P(Ry(t) /∈ Fi(y) ∩ Fj(y) for any i 6= j, t ≥ 0) = 1. (4.16)
Now we construct the controlled process (X t, Yt; t ≥ 0) corresponding to the solution to
(HJB-Cp) described in Section 4.1. There are two cases depending on whether X 0− ∈ WNE(y)
or not.
Case 1: X 0− = x ∈ WNE(y). Let τ1 := inf{t > 0 : Ry(t) ∈ ∂WNE(y)} be the first time
when the reflected process Ry, starting at x and driven by B1 = (B
1
1 , . . . , B
N
1 ), hits the bound-
ary ∂WNE(y). Then we have
Xit = x
i +Bi1(t) + η
i
y(t)− ηi+Ny (t) and Yt = y − ηiy(t)− ηi+Ny (t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ1.
At time τ1, the local time ηy pushes the process X back into WNE(y). So X τ1 ∈ WNE(y) ⊂
WNE(Yτ1). Inductively, for k ≥ 2, let
τk := inf
{
t > τk−1 : RYτk−1 (t− τk−1) ∈ ∂WNE(Yτk−1)
}
, (4.17)
where RYτk−1 is a copy of the reflected process in WNE(Yτk−1), starting at X τk−1 and driven
by Bk = (B
1
k, . . . , B
N
k ). Then we have for τk−1 ≤ t ≤ τk,
Xit = X
i
τk−1 +B
i
k(t− τk−1) + ηiYτk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Yτk−1
(t− τk−1),
and
Yt = Yτk−1 − ηiYτk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Yτk−1
(t− τk−1).
12 XIN GUO, WENPIN TANG, AND RENYUAN XU
So X is constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving domain
according to the amount of remaining resource Y .
Let τY := inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = 0} be the time at which the resource is used up. The controlled
process (X,Y ) can be expressed as
Xit = x
i +
∑
k≥1
1τk≤t∧τY
(
Bik(τk − τk−1) + ηiYτk−1 (τk − τk−1)− η
i+N
Yτk−1
(τk − τk−1)
)
+
∑
k≥1
1τk−1≤t∧τY <τk
(
Bik(t− τk−1) + ηiYτk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Yτk−1
(t− τk−1)
)
, (4.18)
and
Yt = y −
∑
k≥1
1τk≤t∧τY
 2N∑
j=1
ηjYτk−1
(τk − τk−1)
−∑
k≥1
1τk−1≤t∧τY <τk
 2N∑
j=1
ηjYτk−1
(t− τk−1)
 ,
(4.19)
with convention τ0 := 0. If x ∈ Fi(y) ∩ Fj(y) for some i 6= j, then a small perturbation in the
NE game value reduces the case to x ∈ WNE(y). Thus P(dξitdξjt 6= 0 for any i 6= j, t ≥ 0) = 1.
Case 2: X 0− = x /∈ WNE(y), that is, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that (X 0−, Y0−) ∈ Ai.
We show that the controlled process X jumps sequentially to a point x̂ ∈ WNE(ŷ) for some
0 ≤ ŷ < y, and then follows the dynamics (4.18)-(4.19) starting at x̂ ∈ WNE(ŷ). In this
case, the jumps will either stop in finite steps, or converge to a limit point x̂ ∈ ∂WNE(ŷ) for
0 ≤ ŷ < y.
For each k ≥ 1, let xk = (x1k, . . . , xNk ) be the positions, and yk be the remaining resource after
the kth jump. If (xk, yk) ∈ Ai, then the ith player will jump until X hits ∂E+i ∪ ∂E−i . Suppose
that the jumps do not stop in finite steps. At the kth step, let x
(1)
k ≤ . . . ≤ x(N)k be the order
statistics of xk. Note that only the player with position x
(1)
k or x
(N)
k intervenes. Then (x
(1)
k )k≥0
is non-decreasing and bounded from above by x
(N)
0 , therefore (x
(1)
k )k≥0 converges, and so does
(x
(N)
k )k≥0. Hence (xk)k≥0 converges. Now suppose that xk → x̂ /∈ ∂WNE(ŷ) for any ŷ > 0. Let
i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that x̂ ∈ Ai∗ . For k sufficiently large, we have |xk − x̂| < ε and by the
triangle inequality,∣∣∣∣∣xi∗k −
∑
j 6=i∗ x
j
k
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ max1≤i≤N
{∣∣∣∣∣x̂ik −
∑
j 6=i x̂
j
k
N − 1
∣∣∣∣∣− f−1N (ŷ)
}
− 2ε.
Thus the ith∗ player should jump at least
(
max1≤i≤N
{∣∣∣∣x̂ik − ∑j 6=i x̂jkN−1 ∣∣∣∣− f−1N (ŷ)}− 2ε) ∧ ŷ in
the (k + 1)th step. It suffices to take ε sufficiently small to get a contradiction.
In summary, the controlled process inherits a rich structure from the candidate solution.
• If starting at a point in the common waiting region of all N players, then the controlled
process is a reflected Brownian motion with an evolving free boundary.
• If staring at a point outside the common waiting region, then the controlled process
follows rank-dependent dynamics with a moving origin.
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4.3. NE for the N-player game. Combining the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and based
on the verification theorem developed in Section 3, we have the following theorem of the NE
for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint (4.1).
Theorem 4.1 (NE for the N -player game Cp). Let v
i : RN × R+ → R be defined by
vi(x, y) =

pN (x˜
i) +AN (y) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N−1)α
N
)
if (x, y) ∈ W−i ∩Wi,
vi
(
x−i, xi+ +
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 , fN (x
i
+)
)
if (x, y) ∈ W−i ∩ E+i ,
vi
(
x−i,
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 − xi−, fN (xi−)
)
if (x, y) ∈ W−i ∩ E−i ,
vi
(
x−j , xj+ +
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 , fN (x
j
+)
)
if (x, y) ∈ Aj ∩ E+j for j 6= i,
vi
(
x−j ,
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 − xj−, fN (xj−)
)
if (x, y) ∈ Aj ∩ E−j for j 6= i,
(4.20)
where
• Ai andWi are given in (4.3), and E±i is given in (4.4) with fN (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9),
• x˜i is defined by (4.2), and AN (·) is defined by (4.8),
• xi+ is the unique positive root of z− fN (z) = x˜i− y, and xi− is the unique negative root
of z + fN (z) = x˜
i + y.
Then vi is the game value associated with an MNEP ξ∗ = (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗). That is,
vi(x, y) = J iCp(x, y;ξ
∗).
Moreover, the controlled process (X ∗, Y ∗) under ξ∗ is given in Section 4.2.
Proof. It suffices to apply Theorem 3.4 with the construction of
ui(x, y) =

pN (x˜
i) +AN (y) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N−1)α
N
)
if (x, y) ∈ (E−i ∪ E+i )c,
ui
(
x−i, xi+ +
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 , fN (x
i
+)
)
if (x, y) ∈ E+i ,
ui
(
x−i,
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 − xi−, fN (xi−)
)
if (x, y) ∈ E−i ,
(4.21)
which is easily shown to be C2(RN × R+) and convex. 
To illustrate, we specialize Theorem 4.1 to the case N = 2 and h(x) = x2.
Corollary 4.2 (NE for the two-player game Cp). The following controls
ξ1∗,+t = 0,
ξ1∗,−t = 0,
ξ2∗,+ = max
{
0,max0≤s≤t{0, x1 − x2 +B1s −B2s − ξ2∗,+s + ξ2∗,−s − (fsq2 )−1(y − ξ2∗,+s − ξ2∗,−s )}
}
,
ξ2∗,− = max
{
0,max0≤u≤t{0, x2 − x1 +B2s −B1s + ξ2∗,+s − ξ2∗,−s − (fsq2 )−1(y − ξ2∗,+s − ξ2∗,−s )}
}
,
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give an MNEP for the two-player game (2.7) with (4.1) and h(x) = x2, where (fsq2 )
−1
is defined
in (4.11). Moreover, let v1 and v2 be the associated values of the above MNEP (ξ1∗, ξ2∗), then
v1(x1, x2, y) =

(x1−x2)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y) cosh
(
(x1 − x2)√α) if |x1 − x2| ≤ (f sq2 )−1(y),
v1(x1, x1 + x2+, f2(x
2
+)) if x
1 ≤ x2 − (fsq2 )−1(y),
v1(x1, x1 − x2−, f2(x2−)) if x1 ≥ x2 + (fsq2 )−1(y),
(4.22)
and
v2(x1, x2, y) =

(x2−x1)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y) cosh
(
(x2 − x1)√α) if |x2 − x1| ≤ (f sq2 )−1(y),
v2(x1, x1 − x2−, f2(x2−)) if x2 ≤ x1 − (fsq2 )−1(y),
v2(x1, x1 + x2+, f2(x
2
+))) if x
2 ≥ x1 + (fsq2 )−1(y),
(4.23)
where
A(y) = −2α2(cosh(z)− z sinh(z))|
z=
√
α(fsq2 )
−1
(y)
, (4.24)
and x2+ is the unique root of z−fsq2 (z) = x1−y, and x2− is the unique root of z+f sq2 (z) = x1+y.
Note that under partition {Qi}i=1,2, we have A1 = ∅, hence (ξ1∗,+, ξ1∗,−) = (0, 0).
(a) No control from player one. (b) Control from player two.
Figure 2. Case Cp : MNEP when N = 2.
5. Nash Equilibrium For Game Cd
In this section, we study the MNEP of the N -player game Cd . That is A = IN ∈ RN×N , and
Y it = y
i − ξˇit with Y i0− = yi. (5.1)
Recall that the major difference between game Cp and game Cd is that, in the former all N
players share a fixed amount of the same resource, while in the latter each player has her own
individual fixed resource constraint. This difference is reflected in (HJB−Cp) and (HJB−Cd)
in terms of their dimensionality, and in each player’s control based on the remaining resources.
In particular, (HJB − Cp) and the state space (x, y) of Cp are of dimension N + 1, whereas
(HJB −Cd) and the state space (x,y) of Cd are of dimension 2N . Moreover, in game Cp , the
gradient constraint is −viy ± vixi for player i. In contrast, in game Cd , each player controls her
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own resource level, the gradient constraint becomes −vi
yi
± vi
xi
for player i. So if Ai ∩ Aj = ∅,
the HJB equation for vi(x,y) in game Cd is as follows.
(HJB-Cd)

min
(xi,yi)∈R×R+
−αvi + h
(
N − 1
N
x˜i
)
+
1
2
N∑
j=1
vixjxj ,−viyi + vixi ,−viyi − vixi
 = 0,
for (x,y) ∈ W−i,
min(xj ,yj)∈R×R+
{
−vi
yj
+ vi
xj
,−vi
yj
− vi
xj
}
= 0, for (x,y) ∈ Aj , j 6= i.
Note that the control policy of the ith player only depends on (x, yi) in W−i. As seen in
Section 4, for the controlled process of type Cp , upon hitting the boundary of the polyhedron,
the polyhedron will expand in all directions. While for the controlled process of type Cd , only
one direction of the the polyhedron will move once hit.
To proceed, similar to Section 4, define the action region Ai∈ RN × RN+ and the waiting
region Wi of the ith player by
Ai := (E+i ∪ E−i ) ∩Qi and Wi := RN × RN+ \ Ai, (5.2)
where
Qi :=
{
(x,y) ∈ RN × RN+ : |x˜i| − f−1N (yi) ≥ |x˜k| − f−1N (yk) for k < i,
|x˜i| − f−1N (yi) > |x˜k| − f−1N (yk) for k > i
}
,
and
E+i :=
{
(x,y) ∈ RN × RN+ : x˜i ≥ f−1N (yi)
}
and E−i :=
{
(x,y) ∈ RN × RN+ : x˜i ≤ −f−1N (yi)
}
.
(5.3)
Recall the definition of the threshold function fN (·) from (4.7)-(4.9), we now investigate control
of player i which only depends on (x, yi) in W−i. That is, for |x˜i| < f−1N (yi),
vi(x,y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN (y
i) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
, (5.4)
is a solution to (HJB-Cd), where pN (·) is defined by (4.6), and AN (·) defined by (4.8).
The next step is to construct the controlled process (X,Y ) corresponding to the HJB solution
(5.4). For y ∈ RN+ , let
WNE(y) := {x ∈ RN : |x˜i| < f−1N (yi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (5.5)
which is a polyhedron with 2N boundary faces
Fi(y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E−i (y) and Fi+N (y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E+i (y) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where
E+i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x,y) ∈ E+i }, E−i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x,y) ∈ E−i }.
Recall from (4.15) the definition of a reflected process in a polyhedron which satisfies the skew
symmetry condition. Let (Ry(t); t ≥ 0) be the reflected process starting at Ry(0) = x ∈
WNE(y), with the local time process (ηjy(t); t ≥ 0), 1 ≤ j ≤ 2N .
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Case 1: X 0− = x ∈ WNE(y). Let τ0 := 0. Define by induction that for k ≥ 1,
τk := inf
{
t > τk−1 : RY τk−1 (t− τk−1) ∈ ∂WNE(Y τk−1)
}
, (5.6)
where RY τk−1 is a copy of the reflected process in WNE(Y τk−1), starting at X τk−1 and driven
by Bk = (B
1
k, . . . , B
N
k ). We have for τk−1 ≤ t ≤ τk,
Xit = X
i
τk−1 +B
i
k(t− τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(t− τk−1),
and
Y it = Y
i
τk−1 − ηiY τk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(t− τk−1).
So X is constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving polyhedron
according to which boundary face is hit. Let ik ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that RY τk−1 (τk − τk−1) ∈
Fik(Y τk−1) ∪ Fik+N (Y τk−1). Then at time τk, only the ithk and (ik + N)th boundaries will be
changed. Note that this is in contrast to the N -player game Cp , where all 2N boundaries will
be enlarged no matter which boundary face is hit.
Let τY i := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y it = 0} be the time at which the ith player runs out of resources. The
controlled process (X,Y ) can be expressed as
Xit = x
i +
∑
k≥1
1τk≤t∧τY i
(
Bik(τk − τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (τk − τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(τk − τk−1)
)
+
∑
k≥1
1τk−1≤t∧τY i<τk
(
Bik(t− τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(t− τk−1)
)
, (5.7)
and
Y it = y −
∑
k≥1
1τk≤t∧τY i
(
ηiY τk−1
(τk − τk−1) + ηi+NY τk−1 (τk − τk−1)
)
+
∑
k≥1
1τk−1≤t∧τY i<τk
(
ηiY τk−1
(t− τk−1)− ηi+NY τk−1 (t− τk−1)
)
(5.8)
Case 2: X 0− = x /∈ WNE(y). There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that (X 0−,Y 0−) ∈ Ai. For each
k ≥ 1, let xk = (x1k, . . . , xNk ) be the positions, and yk = (y1k, . . . , yNk ) be the resource remaining
after the kth control. If (xk, yk) ∈ Ai, then the ith player will control until X hits ∂E+i ∪ ∂E−i .
The argument in Section 4.2 shows that the controlled process X controls sequentially to a
point x̂ ∈ WNE(ŷ) for 0 ≤ ŷ ≤ y. Then (X,Y ) follows the dynamics (5.7)-(5.8) starting at
(x̂, ŷ).
In summary, the NE for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint Cd is stated as follows.
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Theorem 5.1 (NE for the N -player game Cd). Let v
i : RN × RN+ → R be defined by
vi(x,y) =

pN (x˜
i) +AN (y
i) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N−1)α
N
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩Wi,
vi
(
x−i, xi+ +
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 , fN (x
i
+)
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩ E+i ,
vi
(
x−i,
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 − xi−, fN (xi−)
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩ E−i ,
vi
(
x−j , xj+ +
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 , y
i
)
if (x,y) ∈ Aj ∩ E+j for j 6= i,
vi
(
x−j ,
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 − xj−, yi
)
if (x,y) ∈ Aj ∩ E−j for j 6= i,
(5.9)
where
• Ai andWi are given in (5.2), and E±i is given in (5.3) with fN (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9),
• x˜i is defined by (4.2), and AN (·) is defined by (4.8),
• xi+ is the unique positive root of z− fN (z) = x˜i− y, and xi− is the unique negative root
of z + fN (z) = x˜
i + y.
Then vi is the game value associated with an MNEP ξ∗ = (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗). That is,
vi(x,y) = J iCd(x,y;ξ
∗).
Moreover, the controlled process (X ∗,Y ∗) under ξ∗ is given in this section: Case 1 if X ∗0− ∈
WNE(y), and Case 2 if X ∗0− /∈ WNE(y), where WNE(y) is defined as in (5.5).
Specializing to the two-player game with h(x) = x2, we have the following result.
Corollary 5.2 (NE for N = 2 for game Cd). The following controls
ξ1∗,+t := ∆ξ
1∗,+
0 +
∫ t∧τ1
0
1{X∗s∈F1(Y 1∗s )}1{Y 1∗s >Y 2∗s }dη
1
s ,
ξ1∗,−t := ∆ξ
1∗,−
0 +
∫ t∧τ1
0
1{X∗s∈F3(Y 1∗s )}1{Y 1∗s >Y 2∗s }dη
3
s ,
Y 1∗t := y
1 − ξˆ1∗t , τ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y 1∗t = 0},
ξ2∗,+t := ∆ξ
2∗,+
0 +
∫ t∧τ2
0
1{X∗s∈F2(Y 2∗s )}1{Y 2∗s ≥Y 1∗s }dη
2
s ,
ξ2∗,−t := ∆ξ
2∗,−
0 +
∫ t∧τ2
0
1{X∗t∈F4(Y 2∗s )}1{Y 2∗s ≥Y 1∗s }dη
4
s ,
Y 2∗t := y
2 − ξˆ2∗t , τ2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y 2∗t = 0},
(5.10)
give an MNEP for the two-player game Cd with h(x) = x
2, where
• F1(y) = F4(y) =
{
(x1, x2) : x1 − x2 = −(fsq2 )−1(y)
}
,
• F2(y) = F3(y) =
{
(x1, x2) : x1 − x2 = (fsq2 )−1(y)
}
,
• ηi∗t are non-decreasing processes with ηi∗0− = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3, 4),
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•
∆ξ2∗,+0 =
{
x2−, if y2 ≥ y1 and x2 ≤ x1 − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
x2−, if y2 < y1 and x2 ≤ x1+ − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
∆ξ2∗,−0 =
{
x2+, if y
2 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ x1 − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
x2+, if y
2 < y1 and x2 ≥ x1− − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
∆ξ1∗,+0 =
{
x1−, if y1 > y2 and x1 ≤ x2 − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
x1−, if y1 < y2 and x1 ≤ x2+ − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
∆ξ1∗,−0 =
{
x1+, if y
1 > y2 and x1 ≥ x2 − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
x1+, if y
1 < y2 and x1 ≥ x2− − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
• xi+ is the unique root of z−fsq2 (z) = xj−y, xi− is the unique root of z+fsq2 (z) = xj+y,
with fsq2 (·) is given by (4.11). (i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j).
Moreover, let v1 and v2 be the corresponding values of the above MNEP (ξ1∗, ξ2∗). Then if
y1 > y2,
v1(x1, x2, y1) =

(x1−x2)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y1) cosh
(
(x1 − x2)√α) if |x1 − x2| ≤ (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v1(x1−, x2 − x1−, fsq2 (x1−)) if x1 ≤ x2 − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v1(x1+, x
2 + x1+, f
sq
2 (x
1
+)) if x
1 ≥ x2 + (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v2(x1, x2, y2) =

(x2−x1)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y2) cosh
(
(x2 − x1)√α) if |x2 − x1| ≤ (fsq2 )−1(y2),
v2(x1+, x
2, y2) if x2 ≤ x1 − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
v2(x1−, x2, y2) if x2 ≥ x1 + (fsq2 )−1(y2);
(5.11)
and if y1 ≤ y2,
v1(x1, x2, y1) =

(x1−x2)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y1) cosh
(
(x1 − x2)√α) if |x1 − x2| ≤ (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v1(x1, x2+, y
1) if x1 ≤ x2 − (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v1(x1, x2−, y1) if x1 ≥ x2 + (fsq2 )−1(y1),
v2(x1, x2, y2) =

(x2−x1)2
4α +
1
2α2
+A(y2) cosh
(
(x2 − x1)√α) if |x2 − x1| ≤ (fsq2 )−1(y2),
v2(x1, x1 + x2+, f
sq
2 (x
2
+)) if x
2 ≤ x1 − (fsq2 )−1(y2),
v2(x1, x1 − x2−, fsq2 (x2−)) if x2 ≥ x1 + (fsq2 )−1(y2),
(5.12)
where A(·) is given by (4.24).
Comparison of Corollary 4.2 and Corollary 5.2. Consider N = 2 and h(x) = x2. In
game Cp , only player two controls the two separating hyperplanes whereas player one does
nothing, see Figure 2. In game Cp , player one controls the two separating hyperplanes when
y1 > y2 and she does nothing when y2 ≥ y1. See Figure 3.
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(a) y1 ≤ y2: no control from player one. (b) y1 > y2: player one controls.
(c) y1 ≤ y2: player two controls. (d) y1 > y2: no control from player two.
Figure 3. Case Cd : MNEP when N = 2.
6. Nash Equilibrium for game C
In the previous two sections, we have dealt with two special games Cp and Cd . Analysis
of these two games provides important insight into the solution structure of the general game
C . Namely, the NE strategy depends on the positions of players and their remaining resource
levels. With these two special cases in mind, now recall that in game C ,
dY jt = −
N∑
i=1
aijY
j
t−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
t−
dξˇit and Y
j
0− = y
j≥ 0. (6.1)
For the HJB equation (HJB−C), the gradient constraint is more complicated than the two
special cases Cp and Cd . When Ai ∩ Aj = ∅,
(HJB-C)

min
(xi,y)∈R×RM+
{
− αvi + h+ 1
2
N∑
j=1
vixjxj ,−
M∑
j=1
aijy
j∑M
k=1 aiky
k
viyj + v
i
xj ,−
M∑
j=1
aijy
j∑M
k=1 aiky
k
viyj − vixi
}
= 0,
for (x,y) ∈ W−i,
min(xj ,y)∈R×RM+
{
−∑Mk=1 ajkyk∑M
s=1 ajsy
s v
i
yk + v
i
xj ,−
∑M
k=1
ajky
k∑M
s=1 ajsy
s v
i
yk − vixj
}
= 0,
for (x,y) ∈ Aj , j 6= i.
In particular, if A = [1, 1, · · · , 1]T ∈ RN×1, then (HJB−C) becomes (HJB−Cp); and if A = IN , then
it is (HJB − Cd).
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Similar to Section 4, define the action region Ai∈ RN × RM+ and the waiting region Wi of the ith
player by
Ai := (E+i ∪ E−i ) ∩Qi and Wi := RN × RN+ \ Ai, (6.2)
where
Qi :=
(x,y) ∈ RN × RM+ : |x˜i| − f−1N
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 ≥ |x˜k| − f−1N
 M∑
j=1
akjy
j
 for k < i,
|x˜i| − f−1N
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 > |x˜k| − f−1N
 M∑
j=1
akjy
j
 for k > i
 ,
and
E+i :=
(x,y) ∈ RN × RM+ : x˜i ≥ f−1N
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 and E−i :=
(x,y) ∈ RN × RM+ : x˜i ≤ −f−1N
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 .
(6.3)
From the analysis in Sections 4 and 5, and the “guess” that the control policy of player i only depends
on (x,
∑M
j=1 aijy
j) when in W−i, we get for |x˜i| < f−1N (
∑M
j=1 aijy
j),
vi(x,y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 cosh(x˜i√2(N − 1)α
N
)
, (6.4)
is a solution to (HJB-C), where pN (·) is defined by (4.6), and AN (·) defined by (4.8).
The next step is to construct the controlled process (X,Y ) corresponding to the HJB solution (6.4).
For y ∈ RM+ , let
WNE(y) :=
x ∈ RN : |x˜i| < f−1N
 M∑
j=1
aijy
j
 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N
 , (6.5)
which is a polyhedron with 2N boundary faces
Fi(y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E−i (y) and Fi+N (y) = ∂WNE(y) ∩ ∂E+i (y) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where
E+i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x,y) ∈ E+i }, E−i (y) = {x ∈ RN : (x,y) ∈ E−i }.
Recall from (4.15) the definition of a reflected process in a polyhedron which satisfies the skew symmetry
condition. Let (Ry(t); t ≥ 0) be the reflected process starting at Ry(0) = x ∈ WNE(y), with the local
time process (ηjy(t); t ≥ 0), 1 ≤ j ≤ 2N .
Case 1: X 0− = x ∈ WNE(y). Let τ0 := 0. Define by induction that for k ≥ 1,
τk := inf
{
t > τk−1 : RY τk−1 (t− τk−1) ∈ ∂WNE(Y τk−1)
}
, (6.6)
where RY τk−1 is a copy of the reflected process in WNE(Y τk−1), starting at X τk−1 and driven by
Bk = (B
1
k, . . . , B
N
k ). We have for τk−1 ≤ t ≤ τk,
Xit = X
i
τk−1 +B
i
k(t− τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(t− τk−1),
and
Y jt = Y
j
τk−1 −
N∑
i=1
∫ t−τk−1
0
aijY
j
s+τk−1−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
s+τk−1−
dηiY τk−1
(s)−
N∑
i=1
∫ t−τk−1
0
aijY
j
s+τk−1−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
s+τk−1−
dηi+NY τk−1
(s).
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So X is again constructed by pasting copies of reflected Brownian motion in an evolving polyhedron
according to which boundary face is hit. Let ik ∈ {1, . . . , N} such thatRY τk−1 (τk−τk−1) ∈ Fik(Y τk−1)∪
Fik+N (Y τk−1). For any two players i 6= j, if ai ·aj 6= 0, we say player i and player j are connected since
they share at least one resource type. Similarly, we say player i and player j are disconnected if ai ·aj = 0.
Then at time τk, not only the i
th
k and (ik + N)
th boundaries will be changed, but also the faces from
the players who are connected to player ik. This is because at least one type of resource will decrease
after player ik’s controls. This is in contrast to the N -player game under constraint Cp , where all 2N
boundaries will be enlarged no matter which boundary face is hit. This differs also from game Cd in
terms of the exact boundary faces involved.
Let τXi := inf{t ≥ 0 :
∑
aijY
j
t = 0} be the time at which player i runs out of resource. The controlled
process (X,Y ) can be expressed as (i = 1, 2, · · · , N, j = 1, 2, · · · ,M),
Xit = x
i +
∑
k≥1 1τk≤t∧τXi
(
Bik(τk − τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (τk − τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(τk − τk−1)
)
+
∑
k≥1 1τk−1≤t∧τY i<τk
(
Bik(t− τk−1) + ηiY τk−1 (t− τk−1)− η
i+N
Y τk−1
(t− τk−1)
)
, (6.7)
and
Y jt = y
j −∑Ni=1∑k≥1 1τk≤t∧τXi (∫ τk−τk−10 aijY js+τk−1−∑M
k=1 ajkY
k
s+τk−1−
dηiY τk−1
(s)
+
∫ τk−τk−1
0
aijY
j
s+τk−1−∑M
k=1 ajkY
k
s+τk−1−
dηi+NY τk−1
(s)
)
+
∑N
i=1
∑
k≥1 1τk−1≤t∧τXi<τk
(∫ t−τk−1
0
aijY
j
s+τk−1−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
s+τk−1−
dηiY τk−1
(s)
+
∫ t−τk−1
0
aijY
j
s+τk−1−∑M
k=1 aikY
k
s+τk−1−
dηi+NY τk−1
(s)
)
. (6.8)
Case 2: X 0− = x /∈ WNE(y). There exists i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that (X 0−,Y 0−) ∈ Ai. For each k ≥ 1,
let xk = (x
1
k, . . . , x
N
k ) be the positions, and yk = (y
1
k, . . . , y
M
k ) be the remaining resource level after the
kth jump. If (xk, yk) ∈ Ai, then the ith player will jump until X hits ∂E+i ∪ ∂E−i . The argument in
Section 4.2 shows that the controlled processX jumps sequentially to a point x̂ ∈ WNE(ŷ) for 0 ≤ ŷ ≤ y.
Then (X,Y ) follows the dynamics (6.7)-(6.8) starting at (x̂, ŷ).
The NE for the N -player game (2.7) with constraint C is stated as follows.
Theorem 6.1 (NE for the N -player game C). Let vi : RN × RM+ → R be defined by
vi(x,y) =

pN (x˜
i) +AN (
∑M
j=1 aijy
j) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N−1)α
N
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩Wi,
vi
(
x−i, xi+ +
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 , fN (x
i
+)
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩ E+i ,
vi
(
x−i,
∑
k 6=i x
k
N−1 − xi−, fN (xi−)
)
if (x,y) ∈ W−i ∩ E−i ,
vi
(
x−j , xj+ +
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 , y
i
)
if (x,y) ∈ Aj ∩ E+j for j 6= i,
vi
(
x−j ,
∑
k 6=j x
k
N−1 − xj−, yi
)
if (x,y) ∈ Aj ∩ E−j for j 6= i,
(6.9)
where
• Ai and Wi are given in (6.2), and E±i is given in (6.3) with fN (·) defined by (4.7)-(4.9),
• x˜i is defined by (4.2), and AN (·) defined by (4.8),
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• xi+ is the unique positive root of z − fN (z) = x˜i −
∑M
j=1 aijy
j, and xi− is the unique negative
root of z + fN (z) = x˜
i +
∑M
j=1 aijy
j.
Then vi is the value associated with a MNEP ξ∗ = (ξ1∗, . . . , ξN∗). That is,
vi(x,y) = J iC(x,y;ξ
∗).
Moreover, the controlled process (X∗,Y ∗) under ξ∗ is given by (6.7)-(6.8) as Case 1 if X ∗0− ∈ WNE(y),
and described as Case 2 if X∗0− /∈ WNE(y), where WNE(y) is defined as in (6.5).
7. Comparing Games Cp, Cd and C
In this section, we compare the games Cp , Cd and C . We will first compare their game values and
discuss their economic implications. We will then discuss their difference in terms of the NEP. Finally,
we discuss their perspective NEs in the framework of controlled rank-dependent SDEs.
To make the games comparable, let us assume y =
∑N
j=1 y
j . Let us also consider a special sharing
game Cs which can be connected with both Cd and Cp :
Cs: M = N and aii = 1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
7.1. Pooling, Dividing, and Sharing. Denote the game value and waiting region for each player i
as viCp and W
Cp
i respectively for game Cp . Similar notations are defined for Cd and Cs .
Comparing game values.
Proposition 7.1 (Game values comparison). For each (x,y) ∈ RN ×RN+ , if (x, y) ∈ WCpi , and (x,y) ∈
WCdi ∩WCsi , then,
viCp(x, y) ≤ viCs(x, y) ≤ viCd(x,y), i = 1, 2, · · · , N.
Proof. The comparison is by direct computaiton. Indeed, recall that in case Cp , when (x, y) ∈ WCpi ,
viCp(x, y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN (y) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
,
for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , where x˜i is defined in (4.2) and AN is defined in (4.8).
Similarly, in case Cd , when (x,y) ∈ WCdi ,
viCd(x,y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN (y
i) cosh
(
x˜i
√
2(N − 1)α
N
)
,
for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N . And, in case Cs , when (x,y) ∈ WCsi ,
viCs(x,y) = pN (x˜
i) +AN
 N∑
j=1
aijy
j
 cosh(x˜i√2(N − 1)α
N
)
,
for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N . By elementary calculations,
A′N (y) < 0.
Therefore, when y =
∑N
j=1 y
j , (x, y) ∈ WCpi , and (x,y) ∈ WCdi ∩WCsi ,
viCp(x, y) ≤ viCs(x, y) ≤ viCd(x,y).
The first inequality holds because y =
∑N
i=1 y
i ≥∑Ni=1 aijyj and the equality holds if and only if aij = 1
for each j = 1, 2, · · · , N . The second inequality holds because aii = 1 and the equality holds if and only
if aij = 0 for each j 6= i. 
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This result has a clear economic interpretation. In a stochastic game where players have the options
to share resources, versus the possibility to divide resources in advance, sharing will have lower cost
than dividing. Pooling yields the lowest cost for each player.
(a) Cp (b) Cd
(c) C
Figure 4. Comparison of evolving free boundaries for Cp , Cd , C when N = 3.
Figure 4a shows a pooling game Cp . After one player exercises controls, all the faces of the boundary
move. Figure 4b corresponds to a dividing game Cd . After player i exercises controls, her faces of Fi and
Fi+N move. Here i = 1, N = 3. For a sharing game C , shown in Figure 4c, after one player exercises
her controls, the faces of the players who are connected with her will move, while the faces for other
players remain unchanged. Here i = 2 and player 2 and 3 are connected.
7.2. NEs for the games and controlled rank-dependent SDEs. In the previous sections, the
controlled dynamics is constructed directly via the reflected Brownian motion. This class of SDEs can
also be cast in the framework of rank-dependent SDEs. Indeed, the controlled dynamics of NE in the
action regions of the N -player can be written as a controlled rank-dependent SDEs:
dXit =
N∑
j=1
1F i(X t,Y t)=F (j)(X t,Y t)
(
δjdt+ σjdB
j
t + dξ
j,+
t − dξj,−t
)
,
dY jt = −
N∑
i=1
aijY
j
s−∑M
j=1 aijY
j
s−
dξˇis,
with (ξi,+, ξi,−) the controls, F i : RN × RM+ → R a rank function depending on both X and Y ,
F (1) ≤ . . . ≤ F (N) the order statistics of (F i)1≤i≤N , and δi ∈ R, σi ≥ 0. In game Cp , the controlled
dynamics in the action regions satisfies the SDEs with F iCp(x,y) = |xi −
∑
j 6=i xj
N−1 |, δi = 0 and σi = 0 for
each i = 1, . . . N , and
ξi,± = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , N − 1 and ξN,± 6= 0.
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In game Cd ,
F iCd(x,y) =
∣∣∣∣∣xi −
∑
j 6=i xj
N − 1 − f
−1
N (y
i)
∣∣∣∣∣.
For the general game C , the controlled process in the action regions is governed by the rank-dependent
dynamics with F iC(x,y) = |xi −
∑
j 6=i xj
N−1 − f−1N (
∑M
j=1 aijy
j)| where fN is a threshold function defined in
(4.7)-(4.9), and δi, σi and ξ
i,± satisfy the same condition as before.
Note that the special case without controls, i.e., F i(x,y) = xi and ξi,± = 0, corresponds to the
rank-dependent SDEs. In particular, the rank-dependent SDEs with δ1 = 1, δ2 = . . . δN = 0 is known
as the Atlas model. To the best of our knowledge, rank-dependent SDEs with additional controls or a
general rank function F i has not been studied before. There are various aspects including uniqueness
and sample path properties that await further investigation and we leave them to interested readers.
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